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Abstract
Experiments in research on memory, language, and in other areas of cognitive science are
increasingly being analyzed using Bayesian methods. This has been facilitated by the
development of probabilistic programming languages such as Stan, and easily accessible
front-end packages such as brms. The utility of Bayesian methods, however, ultimately
depends on the relevance of the Bayesian model, in particular whether or not it accurately
captures the structure of the data and the data analyst’s domain expertise. Even with
powerful software, the analyst is responsible for verifying the utility of their model. To
demonstrate this point, we introduce a principled Bayesian workflow (Betancourt, 2018) to
cognitive science. Using a concrete working example, we describe basic questions one
should ask about the model: prior predictive checks, computational faithfulness, model
sensitivity, and posterior predictive checks. The running example for demonstrating the
workflow is data on reading times with a linguistic manipulation of object versus subject
relative clause sentences. This principled Bayesian workflow also demonstrates how to use
domain knowledge to inform prior distributions. It provides guidelines and checks for valid
data analysis, avoiding overfitting complex models to noise, and capturing relevant data
structure in a probabilistic model. Given the increasing use of Bayesian methods, we aim
to discuss how these methods can be properly employed to obtain robust answers to
scientific questions. All data and code accompanying this paper are available from
https://osf.io/b2vx9/.
Keywords: Workflow, prior predictive checks, posterior predictive checks, model
building, Bayesian data analysis
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Introduction
Recent years have seen a rise in the use of Bayesian statistics for data analysis in the
cognitive sciences and other areas. There are many perspectives on Bayesian inference,
especially in cognitive science; for recent overviews see special issues in the Journal of
Mathematical Psychology (Lee, 2011; Mulder & Wagenmakers, 2016), in Psychological
Methods (Chow & Hoijtink, 2017; Hoijtink & Chow, 2017), and in Psychonomic Bulletin &
Review (Vandekerckhove, Rouder, & Kruschke, 2018); for introductory articles see Etz &
Vandekerckhove (2018) and Etz et al. (2018). The rise in the use of Bayesian statistics has
been fueled by increasing recognition of the advantages of robust Bayesian analyses
(Gelman et al., 2014). In this paper we discuss a workflow to help build Bayesian analyses
of principled models that strive to capture the relevant details of the processes that
generate data and the domain expertise pertinent to those processes.
For the field of cognitive science, one advantage is that Bayesian analyses are more
robust than frequentist equivalents as they regularize inference in low-power situations
(Gelman et al., 2014; Morey, Romeijn, & Rouder, 2016). Importantly, Bayesian methods
provide a possibility to quantify uncertainty about cognitive parameters and models, which
is not provided by frequentist approaches (Wagenmakers, Morey, & Lee, 2016). Moreover,
Bayesian inference works the same for statistical and process models, yielding a general
framework for statistical and computational analyses (Lee, 2011; Lee & Wagenmakers,
2014). Specifically, nonlinear hierarchical models are conceptually and computationally
inconvenient in frequentist contexts, but are conceptually simple and computationally
tractable in Bayesian frameworks (for some examples of Bayesian hierarchical models, see,
Morey, 2011; Ly et al., 2017; Nilsson, Rieskamp, & Wagenmakers, 2011; Pooley, Lee, &
Shankle, 2011; Pratte & Rouder, 2011). More generally, the Bayesian framework speeds up
the process of developing and fitting hierarchical and mixed models (Gelman et al., 2014).
In these models, the prior is that "people are not so dissimilar", and regularization falls out
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as a natural consequence. An alternative way to use priors as part of the modeling is to
encode different sets of beliefs in the prior (Haaf & Rouder, 2017), whereby different
theoretical hypotheses are encoded in the prior.
Most Bayesian posterior estimation requires software for posterior sampling. Much
progress has been made in the development of probabilistic programming languages such as
Stan (Carpenter et al., 2017), WinBUGS (Lunn, Thomas, Best, & Spiegelhalter, 2000),
JASP (JASP Team, 2019), and JAGS (Plummer, 2012). Packages like brms (Bürkner,
2017b) and rstanarm (Goodrich, Gabry, Ali, & Brilleman, 2018) now provide easy access to
fitting complex hierarchical (non-)linear mixed models in the R System for Statistical
Computing (R Core Team, 2016). Front-ends like brms and rstanarm have the advantage
that standardly used models in cognitive science can be fit using a familiar syntax that is
well-known from fitting frequentist linear mixed effects models (the lme4 package, Baayen,
Davidson, & Bates, 2008; Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015).
Although complex and powerful, Bayesian analysis tools are thus now easily
accessible to lay users, and although these tools greatly facilitate Bayesian computations,
the model specification is still (as it should be) the responsibility of the user. The steps
needed to arrive at a useful and robust analysis, however, are usually not spelt out in
introductory textbooks or tutorial articles. The present paper seeks to fill this gap in the
literature. It assumes that readers have had some previous exposure to and experience
with basic concepts of Bayesian modeling, such as fitting simple Bayesian models (e.g., in
brms or Stan) (Bürkner, 2017a; Kruschke, 2014; Vasishth et al., 2018b) , and are interested
in how to put together their knowledge about basic applications into a robust and
principled workflow.
Much research has been carried out in recent years to develop complementary tools to
ensure robust Bayesian data analyses (e.g., Gabry, Simpson, Vehtari, Betancourt, &
Gelman, 2017; Talts, Betancourt, Simpson, Vehtari, & Gelman, 2018). One of the key
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features of this research has been the formulation of a principled Bayesian workflow for
conducting a probabilistic analysis (Betancourt, 2018), which emphasizes the interplay
between domain expertise encoded in the prior model and information encoded in the
likelihood function. Note that this prior knowledge is only interpretable in the context of
the likelihood (Gelman, Simpson, & Betancourt, 2017). This workflow provides an initial
coherent picture of steps to take for a robust analysis (also see e.g., Gabry et al., 2017),
leaving room for further improvements and methodological developments. At an abstract
level, parts of this workflow can be applied to any kind of data analysis, be it frequentist or
Bayesian, be it based on sampling or on analytic procedures, and be it for linear statistical
models or for non-linear cognitive process models.
The papers cited above, however, are written either for a general audience or for the
professional statistics researcher. For newcomers to Bayesian methods, translating these
ideas to their own domain is often very difficult to impossible. What is needed is an
explicit, reproducible, fully worked-out example of the workflow for a common type of
experimental design. The main challenge with field-specific translations of statistical
methods is that they need to be accessible to a non-technical audience but at the same
time uncompromising on the details. Thus, the principled workflow we present is general to
any kind of modeling. The present paper demonstrates the specific details of how it can be
implemented in the context of cognitive science models. The workflow is thus a general
process that indicates how the user is responsible for making many choices (summary
statistics, utility functions, etc.) appropriate for the context of their analysis. Our example
analysis demonstrates just some possible choices.
In order to fill this gap, for the field of cognitive science (linguistics, psychology, and
related areas), we illustrate one possible implementation of a principled Bayesian workflow
with a reading-time experiment. In a first part, we discuss the steps of the principled
Bayesian workflow (Betancourt, 2018). This involves strategies for model building: we
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discuss an incremental model building strategy (see Betancourt, 2018), and we discuss a
"maximal" model common in experimental contexts (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013).
Moreover, we describe the principled questions to be asked on the model (cf. Betancourt,
2018), and illustrate the underlying concepts visually (cf. Betancourt, 2018). We then
apply this principled Bayesian workflow to an example from the cognitive sciences (a
psycholinguistic data set). We demonstrate how to implement analyses in R, and use the R
package brms (Bürkner, 2017b) for statistical analysis. Note that we illustrate these
concepts using a linear (mixed) model, but that the same principles and workflow are also
valid for non-linear cognitive process models.
Note that some parts of this principled Bayesian workflow can demand considerable
computational resources. Some of these checks, however, could be implemented once for a
given research program, as similar experimental designs and statistical analyses may not
demand a fundamental re-analysis of all the steps of this workflow for every single
follow-up experiment.
Before starting with describing the workflow, we briefly lay out some basic definitions
and terminology related to Bayesian modeling and inference. For a detailed introductory
treatment, see Lambert (2018), and also http://bit.ly/2GPDW74.
In the cognitive sciences, we use the Bayesian framework with the aim to understand
the processes that have generated some observed data y. For this, we use a statistical (or
possibly a computational) model pi(y | θ), which quantifies a set of mathematical narratives
for how the data y might be generated, each narrative labeled by a parameter value, theta.
A simple example of a model could be a linear regression, where the likelihood would be
pi(y | θ, σ) = ∏i 1σ√2pie
(θ−yi)
2
−2σ2 . Here, we consider the more complex case of a hierarchical
linear model, familiar to cognitive scientists as the linear mixed model (Pinheiro & Bates,
2000).
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When the observational model is evaluated at a particular data set it defines a
likelihood function encoding which narratives are more consistent with the observed data
than others. We write down the mathematical form of this more complex model below.
Bayes’ rule allows us to use the likelihood to obtain the posterior probability distribution of
the parameters given the data pi(θ | y):
pi(θ | y) = pi(y | θ)pi(θ)
pi(y)
(1)
This involves prior distributions over the parameters pi(θ). These prior distributions can
represent pre-existing knowledge or beliefs about the parameters that are available before
the data are observed. Incorporating such principled domain expertise in the prior is of key
importance, and provides a major advantage of Bayesian modeling. The term pi(y) is a
normalizing constant, and is obtained by integrating over the whole parameter space:
pi(y) =
∫
pi(y | θ)pi(θ)dθ. Because it is a constant, it can be ignored when computing the
posterior distributions of the parameters.
Given the likelihood and the prior, a key challenge in Bayesian computations is to
compute the posterior distributions of the parameters accurately, and to compute posterior
expectations from this, for example the posterior mean, or alternatively posterior quantiles
in credible intervals. For most interesting applications, the posterior expectations cannot
be computed analytically. Instead, probabilistic posterior sampling (as implemented in
various probabilistic programming languages such as Stan) is a method of choice for
performing accurate posterior computations.
Here, we provide a detailed description of a number of questions to ask about a
model, and checks to perform to validate a probabilistic model. Before going into the
details of this discussion, we first treat the process of model building, and how different
traditions have yielded different approaches to this questions.
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Model building
One strategy for model building is to start with a minimal observational model and
complementary prior model that captures just the phenomenon of interest but not much
other structure in the data. Note that the "model" is the combination of the observational
model and the prior model. For example, this could be a linear model with just the factor
or covariate of main interest. For this model, we perform a number of checks described in
detail in the following sections. If the model passes all checks and does not show signs of
inadequacy, then it can be applied in practice and we can be confident that the model
provides reasonably robust inferences on our scientific question. If the model shows signs of
trouble on one or more of these checks, however, then the model may need to be improved.
Alternatively, we may need to be more modest with respect to our scientific question. For
example, in a repeated measures data-set, we may be interested in estimating the
correlation parameter between two random effects (i.e., their random effects correlation)
based on a sample of 30 subjects. If model analysis reveals that our sample size is not
sufficiently large to estimate the random effects correlation reliably, then we may need to
either increase our sample size, or give up our plan of analyzing the random effects
correlation based on this data.
During the model building process, we make use of an aspirational model piA: we
mentally imagine a model with all the possible details that the phenomenon and
measurement process contain; i.e., we imagine a model that one would fit if there were no
limitations in resources, time, mathematical and computational tools, subjects, and so
forth. It would contain all systematic effects that might influence the measurement process.
For example, influences of time or heterogeneity across individuals. This should be taken
to guide and inform model development; such a procedure prevents random walks in model
space during model development. Note that the model has to consider both the latent
phenomenon of interest as well as the environment and experiment used to probe it.
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The initial model pi1, to the contrary, may only contain enough structure to
incorporate the phenomenon of core scientific interest, but none of the additional
aspects/structures relevant for the modeling or measurement. Manifestations of the
additional, initially left-out structures, which reflect the difference between the initial (pi1)
and the aspirational model (piA) , can then be looked for in the workflow. These summary
statistics can thus inform model expansion from the initial model pi1 into the direction of
the aspirational model piA. If the initial model proves to be inadequate, then the
aspirational model and the associated summary statistics guide model development. If the
expanded model is still not adequate, then another cycle of model development is
conducted.
The range of prior and posterior predictive checks discussed in the following sections
provide a principled Bayesian workflow of how this model expansion is done. The notion of
expansion is critical here. If an expanded model does not prove more adequate, one can
always fall back to the previous model version. Note that in the case of linear models, this
expansion is similar to standard methods of forward selection. The notion of expansion,
however, is more general, and generalizes also to non-linear and process-based models.
As an alternative analysis strategy, a rich tradition in the cognitive and other
experimental sciences relies on “maximal models” for a given experimental design (Barr et
al., 2013). This maximal model contains all effects from experimental manipulations (main
effects and interactions) as well as all within-subject and within-item variance components .
That is, this model is maximal within the scope of a linear regression. Such a maximal
model provides an alternative starting point for the principled Bayesian workflow. In this
case, the focus does not lie so much on model expansion unless we can identify strong
deviations from the linear model assumptions. Instead, core goals are to specify priors
encoding domain expertise, and to ensure computational faithfulness, model sensitivity,
and model adequacy.
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Note that the maximal model is not maximal with respect to the actual data
generating process. Maximal linear models are still bound by the linear regression
structure and hence cannot capture effects such as selection bias in the data, dynamical
changes in processes across time, or measurement error. At the same time this restricted
class of (linear regression) models is exactly what packages like brms and rstanarm target,
so it might also be “maximal” within the possibilities of such tools. Importantly, however,
these “maximal” models are not the aspirational model, which is an image of the true data
generating process. Indeed, aiming to formulate models closer to the aspirational model,
which go beyond the linear modeling framework, may be one reason to consider investing
in learning to express models directly within probabilistic programming languages such as
Stan and JAGS instead of the limited range of (linear and non-linear) models provided in
packages like brms and rstanarm.
Finally, we note that sometimes the results from the Bayesian workflow will show
that our experimental design or data is not sufficient to answer our scientific question at
hand. In this case, ambition need to be tempered, or new data needs to be collected,
possibly with a different experimental design more sensitive to the phenomenon of interest.
Alternatively, researchers may try out a different analysis or formulate a different model
with different assumptions. This may lead to investigation of a different scientific question
than initially asked, or to a different answer to the same question.
One important development in open science practices is preregistration of
experimental analyses and computational modeling approaches (Lee et al., 2019) before the
data are collected. This can be done using online platforms such as the Open Science
Foundation or AsPredicted. What information can or should one document in
preregistration of the Bayesian workflow? If one plans on using the maximal model for
analysis, then this maximal model, including contrast coding (Rabe, Vasishth, Hohenstein,
Kliegl, & Schad, 2020; Schad, Hohenstein, Vasishth, & Kliegl, 2020), fixed effects, and
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random effects should be described. In the case of incremental model building, if a model
isn’t a good fit to the data, then any resulting inference will be limited if not useless (Lee
et al., 2019), so a rigid preregistration is useless unless one knows exactly what the model
is. Thus, the deeper issue with preregistration is that a model cannot be confirmed until
the phenomenon and experiment are all extremely well understood (Lee et al., 2019). One
practical possibility is to describe the initial and the aspirational model, and the
incremental strategy used to probe the initial model to move more towards the aspirational
model. Note that this can also include delineation of summary statistics that one plans to
use for probing the tested models. Even if it is difficult to spell out the aspirational model
fully, it can be useful to preregister the initial model, summary statistics, and the principles
one intends to apply in model selection. Moreover, many aspects of data preprocessing can
be fixed; e.g., which region of interest to analyze, or which dependent variable to use.
Although the maximal modeling approach clearly reflects confirmatory hypothesis testing,
the incremental model building strategy towards the aspirational model may be seen as
lying at the boundary between confirmatory and exploratory, and becomes more
confirmatory the more clearly the aspirational model can be spelled out a priori.
Principled questions on a model
What characterizes a useful probabilistic model? First, a useful probabilistic model
should be consistent with domain expertise. Second, it is key that the model allows
accurate posterior approximation. Third, it must capture enough of the experimental
design to give useful answers to our questions. Finally, a useful probabilistic model should
be rich enough to capture the structure of the true data generating process needed to
answer scientific questions.
So what can we do aiming to meet these properties of our probabilistic model? In the
following, we will outline a number of analysis steps to take and questions to ask in order
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to improve these properties for our model (a more technical presentation is provided in
Betancourt, 2018).
In a first step, we will use prior predictive checks to investigate whether our model is
consistent with our domain expertise. Next, we will investigate computational faithfulness
by studying whether posterior estimation is accurate. Third, we study model sensitivity
and whether we can recover model parameters with the given design and model. As the
last step in model validation, posterior predictive checks assess model adequacy for the
given data-set, that is, they investigate whether the model captures the relevant structure
of the true data generating process.
Prior predictive checks: Checking consistency with domain expertise
The first key question for checking the model is whether the model and the
distributions of prior parameters are consistent with domain expertise. Prior distributions
can be selected based on prior research or plausibility. For complex models, however, it is
often difficult to know which prior distributions should be chosen, and what consequences
distributions of prior model parameters have for expected data. A viable solution is to use
prior distributions to simulate hypothetical data from the model and to check whether the
simulated data are plausible and consistent with domain expertise, which is often much
easier to judge compared to assessing prior distributions in complex models directly. This
approach has been suggested in the device of imaginary results by Good (1950). In
practice, this can be implemented with the following steps. Do the following Nsim times:
1. Using the prior pi(θ), randomly draw a parameter set θ˜ from it: θ˜ ∼ pi(θ)
2. Use this parameter set θ˜ to simulate n hypothetical data points y˜ from the model:
y˜ ∼ pi(y | θ˜).
This simulation method should result in a matrix that has dimensisons Nsim × n.
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To assess whether prior model predictions are consistent with domain expertise, it is
useful to compute summary statistics of the simulated data t(y˜). The distribution of these
summary statistics can be visualized using, for example, histograms (see Fig. 1). This can
quickly reveal whether the data falls in an expected range, or whether a substantial number
of extreme data points are expected a priori. For example, in a study using self-paced
reading times, “extreme” values may be considered to be reading times smaller than 50 ms
or larger than 2000 ms, which would not be impossible, but would be implausible and
largely inconsistent with domain expertise. A small number of observations may actually
take extreme values. Observing a large number of extreme data points in the hypothetical
data, however, would be inconsistent with domain expertise. In this case, the priors or the
model should be adjusted to yield hypothetical data within a range of reasonable values.
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Figure 1 . Prior predictive checks. a) In a first step, define a summary statistic that one
wants to investigate. b) Second, define extremity thresholds (shaded areas), for which one
does not expect a lot of prior data. c) Third, simulate prior model predictions for the data
(histogram) and compare them with the extreme values (shaded areas).
Choosing good summary statistics is more an art than a science. The choice of
summary statistics will be crucial, however, as they provide key markers of what we want
the model to account for in the data. They should thus be carefully chosen and designed
based on expectations we have about the true data generating process and about the kinds
of structures and effects we expect the data may exhibit. Interestingly, summary statistics
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can also be used to encode criticisms: if someone wants to criticize an analysis, then they
can formalize that criticism into a summary statistic that they expect to show undesired
behavior, which could e.g., provide a very constructive way to write reviews. Here, we will
show some examples of useful summary statistics below when discussing data analysis for a
concrete example data-set.
Choosing good priors will be particularly relevant in cases where the likelihood is not
"concentrated" (see Fig. 2, in particular g-i). In linear mixed models, for example, this often
occurs in cases where a maximal model is fit to a small data-set that does not constrain
estimation of all the variance and covariance parameters of the random effects. In
frequentist methods (such as implemented in the lme4 package in the lmer program), this
leads to convergence problems, which indicate that the likelihood is too flat and that the
parameter estimates have high uncertainty.
In such situations, using a prior in a Bayesian analysis (or a more informative prior
rather than a diffuse one) should incorporate just enough domain expertise to suppress
extreme but not impossible parameter values. This may allow the model to be fit, as the
posterior is now sufficiently constrained.
On the contrary, frequentist linear model regression theory is built on assumptions
about asymptotic properties of data sets. If the likelihood is not sufficiently informative to
constrain the parameter values (such as in Fig. 2e), these asymptotic assumptions are
invalid and the results of a frequentist linear model regression no longer fully characterize
inferences about the model. Therefore, introducing prior information in Bayesian
computation allows fitting and interpreting models that cannot be validly estimated using
frequentist tools.
A welcome side-effect of incorporating more domain expertise (into what still
constitutes weakly informative priors) is thus more concentrated prior distributions, which
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can facilitate Bayesian computation. This allows more complex models to be estimated;
that is, using prior knowledge can make it possible to fit models that could otherwise not
be estimated using the available tools. In other words, incorporating prior knowledge
allows us to get closer to the aspirational model in the iterative model building procedure.
Moreover, more informative priors also lead to faster convergence of MCMC algorithms.
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Priora Likelihoodb Posteriorc
Priord Likelihoode Posteriorf
Priorg Likelihoodh Posteriori
Figure 2 . The role of priors for informative and uninformative data. a)-c) When the data
provides good information via the likelihood (b), then a flat prior (a) is sufficient to obtain
a concentrated posterior (c). d)-f) When the data does not sufficiently constrain the pa-
rameters through the likelihood (e), then using a flat prior (d) also leaves the posterior (f)
diffuse. g)-i) When the data does not constrain the parameter through the likelihood (h),
then including domain expertise into a (weakly) informative prior (g) can help to constrain
the posterior (i) to reasonable values.
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Incorporating more domain expertise into the prior also has crucial consequences for
Bayesian modeling when computing Bayes factors. Bayes factors are highly sensitive to the
prior, and in particular to the prior uncertainty. Priors are thus never uninformative when
it comes to Bayes factors. Choosing very diffuse priors (as in Fig. 2d) makes it very
difficult to find posterior evidence in favor of an expanded model, and will often support
the simpler model. For example, in nested model comparison of linear (mixed) models,
large prior uncertainty (cf. Fig. 2d) implies the assumption that the effect of interest could
be very (implausibly) large. Using Bayes factors for such nested model comparison with
high prior uncertainty thus tests whether there is evidence for a very big effect size for the
predictor term in question, which is usually not supported by the data (because the diffuse
prior covers implausibly large effect sizes). When using a weakly informative or even an
informative prior (as in Fig. 2g), with much smaller uncertainty, to the contrary, the Bayes
factor tests whether there is evidence for a small effect of the additional predictor term,
which is much more likely to be the case. Thus, using prior knowledge and specifying priors
with reasonable uncertainty (rather than diffuse priors with large uncertainty) are crucial
in model comparison using Bayes factors.
The described process ends up simulating from the prior predictive distribution,
which specifies how the prior interacts with the likelihood. Mathematically, it computes an
average (integral) over different possible (prior) parameter values. The prior predictive
distribution is:
pi(y) =
∫
pi(y, θ) dθ =
∫
pi(y | θ)pi(θ) dθ =
∫
likelihood(y | θ) · prior(θ) dθ (2)
As a concrete example, suppose we assume that our likelihood is a Normal distribution
with mean µ and standard deviation σ. Suppose that we now define the following priors on
the parameters: µ ∼ Normal(0, 1), and σ ∼ Uniform(1, 2). We can generate the prior
predictive distribution using the following steps:
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– Take one sample m from a Normal(0,1) distribution
– Take one sample s from a Uniform(1,2) distribution
– Generate and save a data point from Normal(m,s)
• The generated data is the prior predictive distribution.
Computational faithfulness: Testing for correct posterior approximations
A key aim in Bayesian data analysis is to compute posterior expectations, such as the
posterior mean or posterior credible intervals (quantiles) of some parameter. For some
simple models and prior distributions, these posterior expectations can be computed
exactly by analytical derivation. This is not possible in more complex models, however,
where analytical solutions cannot be computed. Instead, computational approximations are
needed for estimation. One possible approximation is variational Bayes (MacKay, 2003),
where parameterized probability density functions (e.g., the Gaussian distribution) are
used for approximate posterior inference: the function parameters are estimated such that
the function approximates the posterior as closely as possible. Here, we use another option:
while it is often not possible to compute the posterior exactly, it is possible to draw samples
from it, and we accordingly use (MCMC) sampling to approximate posterior expectations.
Approximations of posterior expectations can be inaccurate. For example, the
computer program built to sample from a posterior can be erroneous. This could involve
an error in the specification of the likelihood, or insufficient sampling of the full density of
the posterior. The sampler may be biased by sampling parameter values that are larger or
smaller than the true posterior, or the variance of the posterior samples may be larger or
smaller than the true posterior uncertainty.
Given that posterior approximations can be inaccurate, it is important to design a
procedure to test whether the posterior approximation of choice is indeed accurate, e.g.,
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that the software used to implement the sampling works without errors for the specific
problem at hand.
To test software, it is possible to use it in situations where there is a known “correct
answer” and to compare the correct result with what the software generates. This
approach, however, is more difficult for testing Bayesian estimation software, which can be
stochastic. Here, an alternative can be to randomly sample model parameters from the
prior distribution, then simulate data from the model (i.e., the likelihood function) given
the sampled parameters, and perform Bayesian inference on the simulated data. If the
Bayesian estimation software works correctly, then on average the obtained posterior will
be correct. This means, for example, that over an ensemble of such simulations the true
parameter values will be contained in any 95% posterior credible intervals in approximately
95% of the simulations. (A 95% credible interval indicates a Bayesian interval in which
95% of the posterior probability mass is contained.) Note that there are many possible 95%
credible intervals — within these simulations the average coverage will be 0.95 for all of
them.
A powerful method for testing whether the posterior approximation of a software is
correct is provided by simulation-based calibration (SBC) (Talts et al., 2018). It tests not
only the correctness of 95% or e.g., also of 75% posterior credible intervals, but
systematically tests the correctness of the whole posterior approximation. This is possible
as it can be shown (see below) that - and this is a remarkable and surprising fact - on
average the posterior looks like the prior. That is, if we repeatedly sample from the prior
and then from the data, and compute many different posteriors from the simulated data,
then the resulting ensemble of posteriors can be compared to the prior, and the average
over the ensemble of posteriors should be the same as the prior. This is a self consistency
condition and holds for any model. Because it holds for any model it doesn’t provide any
information about the validity of a particular model and hence can’t be used to inform
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prior choice. All it does is allow us to check things in the internal context of a model.
Mathematically, it can be shown that
pi(θ′) =
∫ ∫
pi(θ′ | y)pi(y | θ)pi(θ) dydθ (3)
That is, we draw a sample θ from the prior, pi(θ), simulate some data from the likelihood,
pi(y | θ), and then estimate posterior parameters, pi(θ′ | y), from the simulated data. When
we take the average of the posterior over different simulated true parameters (
∫
dθ) and
over different simulated data-sets (
∫
dy), we will obtain a posterior that recovers the prior
distribution (pi(θ′)).
SBC might seem similar to "parameter recovery". In Bayesian inference, however,
there is no guarantee that the posterior will contain the true value for any single
observation. "Parameter recovery" is a concern for calibration (see next section, on model
sensitivity) where we verify that we have a model capable of learning enough from the data
to recover parameters to the desired accuracy. In contrast, SBC takes advantage of the fact
that averaged over many observations the posterior distribution looks like the prior. We’re
not trying to recover parameters–we’re testing the self-consistency of Bayesian inference.
In practice, to conduct SBC, we use the following procedure:
1. Take the prior pi(θ) and randomly draw a parameter set θ˜ from it: θ˜ ∼ pi(θ)
2. Use this parameter set θ˜ to simulate hypothetical data y˜ from the model: y˜ ∼ pi(y | θ˜)
3. Fit the model to this hypothetical data and draw samples from the posterior
distribution: θ˜′ ∼ pi(θ | y˜)
We repeat steps 1 to 3 many times. In each cycle, we can compare posterior samples
to the parameter set (from step 2.) used to simulate the hypothetical data. We record for
each run where in the posterior distribution the prior parameters lie. If the distributions of
the posterior samples and the sampled prior parameters are the same, the prior parameters
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should equally frequently lie at every location (i.e., rank) within the distribution of the
posterior. Collecting all these locations gives an (ensemble) posterior sample of θ˜′ values.
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Figure 3 . Exemplary results in simulation-based calibration (SBC). a)+b) If the data-
averaged posterior exactly reflects the prior (identical prior and posterior; a) then the SBC
histogram is uniformly distributed, indicating correct posterior approximation. b) The verti-
cal line shows the expected number of ranks in each bin of the histogram based on a uniform
distribution. c)-d) When the SBC histogram shows an inverse U-shaped form (d), then this
indicates that the data-averaged posterior is over-dispersed (c), that is, that it has higher
variance than the prior. e)-f) An SBC histogram showing a symmetric U-shape (f) indicates
that the data-averaged posterior is under-dispersed (e), that is, it has lower variance than
the prior. g)-h) If the SBC histogram is asymmetric (h), then the posterior will be biased
in the opposite direction (g).
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Figure 4 . Exemplary results in simulation-based calibration (SBC): If the posterior samples
exhibit considerable autocorrelation, then this can be visible as spikes at the boundaries of
the histogram.
Accordingly, in simulation-based calibration (Talts et al., 2018), we take each
simulated prior parameter value and test where it is located within the estimated posterior
distribution by computing its rank statistic within the posterior. Said differently, we count
the number of posterior parameter samples θ˜′r that are larger than the given prior
parameter θ˜: ρ = #{θ˜ < θ˜′r}.1 We perform this calculation repeatedly, for every sampled
prior parameter set. The resulting rank statistic of the prior parameters can be plotted as
a histogram. As a central result of SBC (Cook, Gelman, & Rubin, 2006; Talts et al., 2018),
if the posterior model fitting works accurately, then the rank statistics are exactly
uniformly distributed (see Fig. 3a). Different patterns of how the distribution deviates
from the uniform distribution can diagnose different specific problems of the posterior. We
illustrate some examples (see Fig. 3 and Fig. 4) (taken from Talts et al., 2018). Figure 3c
shows a situation where the sampled posterior has a higher variance compared to the prior.
This situation becomes evident as the histogram of SBC ranks takes an inverted U-shaped
form. Alternatively, if the variance of the sampled posterior is too small (compared to the
1Note that an equivalent definition is possible by counting the number of posterior samples that are
smaller (instead of larger) than the given prior parameter (cf. Talts et al., 2018); this yields an equivalent
result.
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prior variance; cf. Fig. 3e), then this is visible in a U-shaped form of the histogram of SBC
ranks. If the sampled posterior distribution is biased compared to the prior, e.g., showing
too small values (see Fig. 3g), then the SBC histogram of ranks will be asymmetric, with a
lot of samples showing large ranks and only few samples showing small ranks. Last, if the
posterior samples have high autocorrelation (Fig. 4), then the SBC histogram of ranks will
show a U-shaped form. Looking at the SBC histogram of ranks can thus provide some
information about different ways of how the sampled posterior may deviate from the prior.
Note that even powerful tools like Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC) sampling do not
always provide accurate posterior estimation, and that it’s therefore important to check
computational faithfulness for a given experimental design, model, and data-set. Only
when we see that our posterior computations are accurate and faithful can we take the next
step, namely looking at the sensitivity of the model analyses.
Model sensitivity
What can we realistically expect from the posterior of a model, and how can we check
whether these expectations are justified for the current setup? First, we might expect that
the posterior recovers the true parameters generating the data without bias. That is, when
we simulate hypothetical data based on a true parameter value, we may expect that the
posterior mean exhibits the same value. Although desirable, however, this expectation may
or may not be justified for a given model, experimental design, and data-set. Indeed,
parameter estimation for some, e.g., non-linear, models may be biased, such that the true
value of the parameter can practically not be recovered from the data. At the same time,
we might expect from the posterior that it is highly informative with respect to the
parameters that generated the data. That is, we may hope for small posterior uncertainty
relative to our prior knowledge, e.g., a small posterior standard deviation. Just as with the
mean, however, the certainty in a posterior may not always be high. Some experimental
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designs, models, or data-sets may yield highly uninformative estimates, where uncertainty
is not reduced compared to our prior information. For example, this can be the case when
we have very little data, when the experimental design does not allow us to constrain
certain model parameters, or when we use a very complex model, where despite having a lot
of data, the data may not be very informative for some of the complex model’s parameters.
An example of the latter situation is the drift diffusion model (Ratcliff & Rouder,
2000), and the model parameter for the non-decision time. Even if very large amounts of
data should be available for a number of subjects, this parameter essentially depends only
on the shortest reaction times for each participant, and thus only on a very small number
of data points. Thus, despite an overall very large amount of data, the posterior
distribution for this parameter may still exhibit considerable posterior uncertainty.
Model sensitivity depends on the question being asked, which in general requires the
specification of a utility function that quantifies how well a posterior distribution answers
that question. Because these questions, and hence utility functions, depend on the
particular context of an application they must be customized for each application.
We can also complement these more precise questions, however, with some coarse
questions that capture high-level information about the expected inferences and provide a
useful general summary.
1) How well does the estimated posterior mean match the true parameter used for
simulating the data?
2) How much is uncertainty reduced from the prior to the posterior?
First, to determine the distance of the posterior mean from the true simulating
parameter, scaled by the posterior variance, it is possible to compute a posterior z-score:
z =
µpost − θ˜
σpost
(4)
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Here, the posterior mean µpost is compared to the true simulating parameter θ˜, and the
difference between them is scaled by the posterior uncertainty (standard deviation, σpost).
This measure estimates how close the posterior mean is to the truth relative to the posterior
standard deviation, in other words how close the entire posterior distribution is to the
truth value. Small (absolute) values close to zero indicate that the posterior mean is close
to the true parameter value, and large (absolute) values indicate that the posterior mean is
far off the true generating model parameter. Note that large positive values versus large
negative values indicate different positive versus negative biases in the posterior estimation.
Second, posterior contraction estimates how much prior uncertainty is reduced in the
posterior estimation:
s = 1− σ
2
post
σ2prior
=
σ2prior − σ2posterior
σ2prior
(5)
Here, the variance of the posterior distribution, σ2post, is divided by the prior variance, σ
2
prior.
In general, additional information from the likelihood will reduce uncertainty, such that the
posterior variance will be smaller than the prior variance. If the data is highly informative,
then the variance in the estimate is strongly reduced, and there will be strong posterior
contraction s close to 1. When the data provide little information, however, then the
posterior variance will be of similar size as the prior variance, and posterior contraction s
will be close to 0.
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Figure 5 . Posterior z-scores as a function of Posterior Contraction. Arrows show four
possible results and their interpretation. The combination of high posterior contraction with
large (positive or negative) posterior z-scores reflects situations of overfitting to noise in the
data. Low posterior contraction with small z-scores reflect a poorly identified model. Low
contraction with large (positive or negative) z-scores indicate a substantial conflict between
the prior and the likelihood. Finally, high posterior contraction and low posterior z-scores
reflect an ideal situation of good model fit.
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To obtain these estimates, we take the following steps:
1. Take the prior pi(θ) and randomly draw a parameter set θ˜ from it: θ˜ ∼ pi(θ)
2. Use this parameter set θ˜ to simulate hypothetical data y˜ from the model: y˜ ∼ pi(y | θ˜)
3. Fit the model to this hypothetical data and draw samples from the posterior
distribution: θ˜′ ∼ pi(θ | y˜)
4. Compute the posterior z-score and the posterior contraction for each sample of
posterior parameters θ˜′.
The distribution of posterior z-scores and posterior contractions can be plotted in a
two-dimensional grid as a scatterplot (see Fig. 5), which provides a useful model diagnostic:
results in the upper or lower right corner likely indicate overfitting of the posterior to a
wrong parameter value; results in the middle left indicate that the model is poorly
identified, i.e., that the data do not well constrain estimation of model parameters; the
upper or lower left corner reflects a situation of substantial conflict between the prior and
the likelihood function; and the middle right side indicates the ideal situation of correct
estimates with low uncertainty.
Note that we choose rather large positive and negative z-values for the y-axis in
Figure 5. The reason of this is that small deviations of the estimated posterior mean are to
be expected since the posterior is fitted onto simulated data, where the simulation process
will introduce some noise and thus deviations of the estimated posterior mean. Larger
z-scores, e.g., larger than absolute values of 3 or 4, however, should only occur rarely due
to this simulation process. Also, it is important to assess posterior z-scores for a range of
simulated data sets. If no bias is present in the simulations, then the distribution of
z-scores should be centered on 0, whereas shifts in the distribution of z-scores to positive or
negative values indicate a bias in the posterior estimation process.
Importantly, the scatterplot doesn’t provide a test for rejecting the current model.
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Instead its intent is to provide key information about the current setup, and to help us
make a decision about the efficacy of the model, that is, whether the model allows us to
obtain good estimates in this experimental design at all. Note that this can vary
considerably over specific collected (or drawn) data-sets. Even with the model and the
experimental design held constant, the model may be highly sensitive for some data-sets,
but exhibit problems for another. This is one reason why we assess sensitivity for a range
of different simulating parameter values covered by the prior distributions, to obtain
information about the range of possible outcomes.
Note that this way of visualizing accuracy and contraction is just a general means of
evaluating the utility of a model. More specific inferential goals can motivate more specific
evaluations. For example, if we want to make a binary decision, such as whether a
parameter θ is larger than zero, θ > 0, then we might look at the distribution of false
discovery rates and true discovery rates.
Posterior predictive checks: Does the model adequately capture the data?
“All models are wrong, but some are useful.” (Box, 1979, p. 202) We know that our
model probably does not fully capture the true data generating process, which is noisily
reflected in the observed data. Our question therefore is whether our model is close enough
to the true process that has generated the data, and whether the model is useful for
informing our scientific question. To compare the model to the true data generating process
(i.e., to the data), we can simulate data from the model fit to data and compare the
simulated to the real data. This can be achieved via a posterior predictive distribution: the
model is fit to the data, and the estimated posterior model parameters are used to simulate
new data. The question then is how close the simulated data is to the observed data.
One way to assess this is using Bayesian cross validation or one of the many
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information criteria, such as BIC, DIC, or WAIC (e.g., Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin, & Linde,
2014; Shiffrin, Lee, Kim, & Wagenmakers, 2008; Vehtari, Gelman, & Gabry, 2017). This
approach, however, only allows for relative comparison between different models, but not
for an absolute measure of model fit. Moreover, the information criteria are only
approximations and hence can be misleading when the approximation is inaccurate. The
information criteria also consider the entire fit of the model, and hence can’t differentiate
between relevant aspects and irrelevant aspects.
An alternative approach is to use features of the data that we care about, and to test
how well the model can capture these. Indeed, we had already defined summary statistics
in the prior predictive checks. We can now compute these summary statistics for the data
simulated from the posterior predictive distribution. This will yield a distribution for each
summary statistic. We compute the summary statistic for the observed data, and can now
see whether the data falls within the distribution of the model predictions (cf. Fig. 6a), or
whether the model predictions are far from the observed data (see Fig. 6b). If the data is
in the distribution of the model, then this supports model adequacy. By contrast, if we
observe a large discrepancy, then this indicates that our model likely misses some
important structure of the true process that has generated the data, and that we have to
consider our domain expertise to further improve the model. Alternatively, however, a
large discrepancy can be due to the data being an extreme observation, which was
nevertheless generated by the process captured in our model. Note that in general we can’t
discriminate between these two possibilities. Consequently, we have to use our best
judgement as to which possibility is more relevant, in particular changing the model only if
the discrepancy is consistent with a known missing model feature.
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Figure 6 . Posterior predictive checks. For a specific summary statistic, t(y), compare pos-
terior model predictions (histogram) with the observed data (vertical line). a) This displays
a case where the observed summary statistic (vertical line) lies within the posterior model
predictions (histogram). b) This displays a case where the summary statistic of the observed
data (vertical line) lies clearly outside of what the model predicts a posteriori (histogram).
Mathematically, the posterior predictive distribution is written:
pi(ypred | y) =
∫
pi(ypred | θ)pi(θ | y) dθ (6)
Here, the observed data y is used to infer the posterior distribution over model parameters
(pi(θ | y)). This is combined with the model or likelihood function (pi(ypred | θ)) to yield
new, simulated, data ypred. The integral
∫
dθ indicates averaging across different possible
values for the posterior model parameters (θ).
We can’t evaluate this integral exactly: θ can be a vector of many parameters,
making this a very complicated integral with no analytical solution. However, we can
approximate it using sampling. Specifically, we can obtain samples from the posterior
distribution, e.g., using HMC or a different MCMC sampling scheme. We can now use each
of the posterior samples as parameters to simulate new data from the model. This
procedure then approximates the integral and yields an approximation to the posterior
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predictive distribution.
Exemplary data analysis
We perform an exemplary analysis of a data-set from Gibson & Wu (2013). We
illustrate the principled Bayesian workflow for a linear mixed model. Note however, that
the workflow is likewise valid for non-linear models of cognition. For the data by Gibson &
Wu (2013), the methodology they used is called self-paced reading; this method is
commonly used in psycholinguistics as a cheaper and faster substitute to eyetracking
during reading. The participant is seated in front of a computer screen and is initially
shown a series of broken lines that mask words from a complete sentence. The participant
then unmasks the first word (or phrase) by pressing the space bar. Upon pressing the space
bar again, the second word/phrase is unmasked and the first word/phrase is masked again;
the time in milliseconds that elapsed between these two space-bar presses counts as the
reading time for the first word/phrase. In this way, the reading time for each successive
word/phrase in the sentence is recorded. Usually, the participant is also asked a yes/no
question at the end of the trial, about the sentence. This is intended to ensure that the
participant is adequately attending to the meaning of the sentence.
Gibson and Wu collected self-paced reading data using Chinese relative clauses.
Relative clauses are sentences like: The student who praised the teacher was very happy.
Here, the so-called head noun, student, is modified by a relative clause who. . . teacher, and
the head noun is the subject of the relative clause as well: the student praised the teacher.
Such relative clauses are called subject relatives. By contrast, one can also have object
relative clauses, where the head noun is modified by a relative clause which takes the head
noun as an object. An example is: The student whom the teacher praised was very happy.
Here, the teacher praised the student. Gibson and Wu were interested in testing the
hypothesis that Chinese shows an object relative (OR) processing advantage relative to
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subject relatives (SR). The theoretical reasons for this are not interesting for the present
purposes. Their experimental design had one factor with two levels: (i) object relative
sentence, and (ii) subject relative sentence. We use sum coding (-1, +1) for this factor,
which we call “so”, an abbreviation for subject-object, where we compute reading times in
object relative sentences minus in subject relative sentences. Following Gibson & Wu
(2013), we analyze reading time on a target word, which was the head noun of the relative
clause; in Chinese, unlike English, the head noun appears after the relative clause. By the
time the participant reads the head noun, they already know whether they are reading a
subject or an object relative. The theory being tested here states that the meaning of the
relative clause is resolved at the head noun and that in Chinese, this meaning resolution
process is easier in object relatives vs. subject relatives.
The data-set contains reading time measurements in milliseconds from 37 subjects
and from 15 items. The design is a classic repeated measures Latin square design; there
were originally 16 items, but due to a scripting error, one item was not shown to
participants. Three participants were removed because they had low question-response
accuracy (less than 70%; the remaining participants’ accuracy was 91%). We analyze the
data using the R function brm in the brms package (Bürkner, 2017b), which provides an
(lme4 -style syntax) interface to fit hierarchical (non-)linear models in the probabilistic
programming language Stan (Carpenter et al., 2017).
Prior predictive checks
The first step in Bayesian data analysis is to specify the statistical model and the
priors for the model parameters. In brms, the latter can be done using the function
set_prior(). One possible standard setup for diffuse priors which is sometimes used in
reading studies (e.g., Paape, Nicenboim, & Vasishth, 2017; Vasishth et al., 2018a), but
which we argue is an example of a "bad" prior, is as follows: For the intercept we use a
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normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 10. Note that this is on the log
scale as we assume a lognormal distribution of reading times. That is, this approach
assumes a priori that the intercept for reading times varies between 0 seconds and (one
standard deviation) exp(10) = 22, 026 ms (i.e., 22 sec) or (two standard deviations)
exp(20) = 485, 165, 195 ms (i.e., 135 hours). Going from seconds to hours within one
standard deviation shows how diffuse this prior is. In brms this is specified as:
set_prior("normal(0, 10)", class = "Intercept"). That is, we can specify a
distribution (normal(0, 10)), and define the class of parameters for which this should
apply; here, we specify that the prior should apply to the intercept (class =
"Intercept").
Table 1
Effect size as a function of the intercept.
Intercept
1 standard
deviation below the
mean
1 standard
deviation above the
mean Effect size
exp(6) = 403 ms exp(6)/ exp(1) =
148 ms
exp(6)× exp(1) =
1097 ms
1097− 148 = 949
ms
exp(5) = 148 ms exp(5)/ exp(1) = 55
ms
exp(5)× exp(1) =
403 ms
403− 54 = 349 ms
exp(7) = 1097 ms exp(7)/ exp(1) =
403 ms
exp(7)× exp(1) =
2981 ms
2981− 403 = 2578
ms
For the effect of linguistic manipulations on reading times, one common standard
prior is to assume a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 (also on the log scale). Note
that the prior on the effect size on log scale specifies an effect size which is a multiplicative
factor, that is, the prediction for the effect size depends on the intercept. For an intercept
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of exp(6) = 403 ms, a variation to one standard deviation above multiples the base effect by
2.71, increasing the mean from 403 to exp(6)× exp(1) = 1097. Likewise a variation to one
standard deviation below divides the base effect by 2.71, decreasing the mean from 403 to
exp(6)× exp(−1) = 148 (see Table 1). This effect size changes dramatically when assuming
a different intercept: for a slightly smaller value for the intercept of exp(5) = 148 ms, the
expected condition difference is reduced to 37% (349 ms), and for a slightly larger value for
the intercept of exp(7) = 1097 ms, the condition difference is enhanced to 272% (2578 ms;
see Table 1). Here, we use this prior for the difference between object-relative and
subject-relative sentences (i.e., the slope), and write this as set_prior("normal(0, 1)",
class = "b", coef="so"), where class = "b" indicates that all fixed effects share this
prior, and coef="so" restricts it to the effect of the slope (OR - SR). We use a truncated
normal distribution with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 as the prior for the
random effects standard deviations (class = "sd") and for the residual variance (class =
"sigma"). This can also be written in brms as normal(0, 1). Because the prior is for a
standard deviation, brm automatically uses a truncated normal distribution instead of the
specified normal distribution (normal(0, 1)). Finally, for the random effects correlation
between the intercept and the slope, we use an lkj prior (Lewandowski, Kurowicka, & Joe,
2009) with a diffuse prior parameter value of 2 (for visualization of the prior see Fig. 7).
We store these priors in an R object called priors (see Supplementary Code S1).
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Figure 7 . Shape of the LKJ prior with parameter 2. This is the prior density for the random
effects correlation parameter, here used as a prior for the correlation between the effect size
(so) and the intercept. The shape shows that correlation estimates close to zero are expected,
and that very strong positive correlations (close to 1) or negative correlations (close to -1)
are increasingly unlikely. Thus, correlation estimates are regularized towards zero.
For prior predictive checks, we use these priors to draw random parameter sets from
the distributions, and to simulate hypothetical data using the statistical model. As a
statistical model, we use the so-called maximal model (Barr et al., 2013) for the design.
Such a model includes fixed effects for the intercept and the slope (“so”; coded using sum
contrast coding: +1 for object relatives, and -1 for subject relatives), correlated random
intercepts and slopes for participants (called subjects in the data frame), and correlated
random intercepts and slopes for items. In brms syntax: rt ~ 1+so + (1+so|subj) +
(1+so|item) and family=lognormal().
Mathematically, this model can be written as follows. We assume the reading time
RTsic of subject s, item i, and experimental condition c ("so") follows a log-normal
distribution:
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p(RTsic | µRTsic , σRT ) =
1
RTsic · σRT
√
2pi
exp{−(lnRTsic − µRTsic)
2
2σ2RT
} (7)
Here, µRT,sic is predicted for subject s, item i, and condition c. We assume that,
µRT,sic = β0 + S0,s + I0,i + (β1 + S1,s + I1,i) · soc. Here, β0 is the intercept, β1 is the slope
(difference between subject and object relative sentences). The by-subject and by-item
intercepts are S0,s and I0,i, and the corresponding slopes are S1,s and I1,i. The residual
standard deviation is σRT .
The by-subject adjustments Ss =

S0,s
S1,s

 follow a multivariate normal distribution
with mean µ0 =

0
0

 and variance-covariance matrix ΣS =

 σ
2
S0
ρSσS0σS1
ρSσS0σS1 σ
2
S1

, where
σS0 is the random effects standard deviation of by-subject intercepts, σS1 is the random
effects standard deviation of by-subject slopes, and ρS is the random-effects correlation
between by-subject intercepts and slopes. The by-item adjustments Ii =

I0,i
I1,i

 follow a
multivariate normal distribution with mean µ0 =

0
0

 and variance-covariance matrix
ΣI =

 σ
2
I0
ρIσI0σI1
ρIσI0σI1 σ
2
I1

, where σI0 is the random effects standard deviation of by-item
intercepts, σI1 is the random effects standard deviation of by-item slopes, and ρI is the
random-effects correlation between by-item intercepts and slopes. The multivariate normal
distributions are:
p(Ss | 0,ΣS) = (2pi)− k2 det(ΣS)− 12 e− 12STs Σ
−1
S
Ss (8)
p(Ii | 0,ΣI) = (2pi)− l2 det(ΣI)− 12e− 12 ITi Σ
−1
I
Ii (9)
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We specify priors for all parameters in the model.
• For the intercept parameter β0 we specify a normal distribution: β0 ∼ N(µ0, σ0).
Here, we set µ0 to 0, and we set σ0 to 10.
• Likewise, for the slope parameter β1 we specify a normal distribution: β1 ∼ N(µ1, σ1).
We set µ1 to 0, and we initially set σ1 to 1.
The other prior parameters specify the random effects terms in the model. These are
discussed next.
• For each of the standard deviations σre =< σS0 , σS1 , σI0 , σI1 > of the random effect
parameters varying across subjects (σS0 and σS1) and across items (σI0 and σI1), we
specify a truncated normal N+, or specifically a half-normal distribution with σre > 0:
σre ∼ N+(0, σσre). Initially, we set σσre to 1 (and the mean of the truncated normal is
assumed to be 0).
• For the random effects correlations ρ =< ρS, ρI > between the intercept and the slope
varying across subjects (ρS) and varying across items (ρI), we assume an LKJ prior
distribution: p(ρ | η) = Z(η) · det |ρ|η−1. We set the prior parameter η to a value of 2.
• For the standard deviation of the log-normal distribution, σRT , we specify a
truncated normal N+, or specifically a half-normal distribution with σRT > 0:
σRT ∼ N+(0, νint). Initially, we set νint to a value of 1 (and the mean of the truncated
normal is assumed to be 0).
Next, we load the data to extract the experimental design. We use our custom R
functions SimFromPrior() and genfake() to simulate parameters from the priors and to
simulate data from the model (see Supplementary Code S2).
Based on the simulated data we can now perform prior predictive checks: we compute
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summary statistics, and plot the distributions of the summary statistic across simulated
data-sets. First, we visualize the distribution of the simulated data. For a single data-set,
this could be visualized as a histogram. Here, we have a large number of simulated
data-sets, and thus a large number of histograms. We represent this uncertainty: for each
bin, we plot the median as well as quantiles showing where 10%-90%, 20%-80%, 30%-70%,
and 40%-60% of the histograms lie (see Supplementary Code S3).
For the current prior data simulations, this shows (see Figure 8a) that most of the
hypothetical reading times are close to zero or larger than 2, 000 ms. It is immediately
clear that the data predicted by this prior follows a very implausible distribution: it looks
exponential, while we would expect a lognormal (or normal) distribution for reading times.
Most data points take on extreme values. Next, we look at further, univariate, summary
statistics that characterize this distribution (e.g., mean and residual standard deviation,
see below) and moreover look at other aspects of the model.
As two additional summary statistics of this distribution, we take a look at the mean
per simulated data-set (at the log scale) and also at the variance (ms scale; see
Supplementary Code S4). The results for the mean, displayed in Figure 8b, show that the
mean varies across a wide range, with a substantial number of data-sets having a mean
larger than 10 on log scale or of exp(10) = 22, 026 on ms scale. Again, this reveals a highly
unplausible assumption about the intercept parameter. The standard deviation, shown on
ms scale for easier readability (Fig. 8d), exhibits a substantial number of values larger than
2, 000, which again is clearly larger than what we would expect for reading times.
We also plot the size of the effect of object relative minus subject relative sentence as
a measure of effect size (Fig. 8c; see Supplementary Code S5). The results show that our
priors commonly assume differences in reading times between conditions of more than
2, 000 ms (see Fig. 8c), which is larger than we would expect for a psycholinguistic
manipulation of the kind investigated here. Note that this is marginalizing the effect across
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different values for this intercept term. More specifically, given that we model reading
times using a lognormal distribution, the expected effect size depends on the value for the
intercept. For example, for an intercept of exp(1) = 2.7 ms and an effect size in log space
of 1 (i.e., one standard deviation of the prior for the effect size), expected reading times for
the two conditions are exp(1− 1) = 1 ms and exp(1 + 1) = 7 ms. By contrast, for an
intercept of exp(10) = 22, 026 ms, the corresponding reading times for the two conditions
would be exp(10− 1) = 8, 103 ms and exp(10 + 1) = 59, 874 ms.
Note that this implies highly varying expectations for the effect size, including the
possibility for very large effect sizes. If we haven’t seen an effect before running the
experiment, however, then we would probably expect the effect to be rather small. Thus,
priors with smaller expected effect sizes may be reasonable.
Figure 8e shows individual differences in the effect of object versus subject relatives.
As a summary statistic (see Supplementary Code S6), we compute the effect size for the
participant with the largest (absolute) difference in reading times between object versus
subject relatives (Fig. 8e). The prior simulations show maximal effect sizes of larger than
2, 000 ms (Fig. 8e), which is more than we would expect for observed data. Similarly, the
variance in hypothetical effect sizes across subjects is large, with many SDs larger than
2, 000 ms (Fig. 8f), and thus again takes many values that are inconsistent with our domain
expertise about reading experiments.
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Figure 8 . Prior predictive checks for a high-variance prior. Distributions are over simulated
hypothetical data. a) Multivariate summary statistic: Distribution of histograms of reading
times shows very short and also very long reading times are expected too frequently by the
diffuse prior. b)-f) Scalar summary statistics. b) Distribution of average log reading times
shows that extremely large reading times, e.g., of exp(10) = 22,026 ms are too frequently ex-
pected. c) Distribution of differences in reading times between object minus subject relatives
shows that very large effect sizes are far too frequently expected. d) Distribution of standard
deviations of residual reading times shows that very large variances are over-expected in the
priors. e) Maximal effect size (object - subject relatives) across subjects again shows far too
many extreme values. f) Standard deviation of effect size (object - subject relatives) across
subjects; again far too many extreme values are expected. a)+c)-f) Values > 2000 or < -2000
are plotted at a value of 2000 or -2000 for visualization.
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Adjusting priors. Based on these graphical summaries of prior predictive data, we
can use our domain expertise to refine our priors and adjust them to values for which we
expect more plausible prior predictive hypothetical data as captured in the summary
statistics.
First, we adapt the prior on the intercept. Upon re-consideration, we choose a normal
distribution in log-space with a mean of 6. This corresponds to an expected grand average
reading time of exp(6) = 403 ms. For the standard deviation, we use a value of SD = 0.6.
For these prior values, we expect a strongly reduced mean reading time and a strongly
reduced standard deviation of the residuals in the simulated hypothetical data. Moreover,
we expect that implausibly small or large values for reading times will no longer occur. For
a visualization of the prior distribution of the intercept parameter in log-space and in
ms-space, see Figure 9a+b. Slightly different values, e.g., for the standard deviation of the
residuals (e.g., SD = 0.5 or 0.7), may yield similar results. Our goal is not to specify a
precise value, but rather to use prior parameter values that are qualitatively in line with
our domain expertise about expected observed reading time data, and that do not produce
highly implausible hypothetical data.
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Figure 9 . Prior distribution in log-space and in ms-space for a toy example of a linear
regression. a) Displays the prior distribution of the intercept in log-space. b) Displays the
prior distribution of the intercept in ms-space. c) Displays the prior distribution of the effect
size in log-space, marginalizing over the intercept. d) Displays the prior distribution of the
effect size in ms-space.
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Next, for the effect of object minus subject relative sentences, we define a normally
distributed prior with mean 0 and a much smaller standard deviation of 0.05. Again, we do
not have precise information on the specific value for the standard deviation. We expect a
generally smaller effect size (see the meta-analysis on Chinese relatives presented in
Vasishth, Chen, Li, & Guo, 2013), and we can check through prior predictive checks (data
simulation and investigation of summary statistics) whether this yields a plausible pattern
of expected results. Figures 9c+d show expected effects in log-scale and in ms-scale for a
simple linear regression example.
In addition, we assume much smaller values for the standard deviations in how the
intercept and the slope vary across subjects and across items of 0.1, and a smaller standard
deviation of the residuals of 0.5. For the correlation between random effects we assume the
same LKJ prior with the same parameter value of 2 as before. For code summary, see
Supplementary Code S7.
Prior predictive checks for weakly informative priors. Based on this new set
of now weakly informative priors, we can again perform prior predictive checks. We again
randomly draw samples of parameters from the priors, use these to simulate data from the
statistical model, and compute summary statistics for the simulated data. We do not show
the R code again for these analyses.
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Figure 10 . Prior predictive checks for weakly informative priors. Distributions are over
simulated hypothetical data. a) Histograms of reading times. Shaded areas correspond to
10-90 percent, 20-80 percent, 30-70 percent, and 40-60 percent quantiles across histograms;
the solid line (in the middle of the shaded area) indicates the median across hypothetical
data-sets. This now provides a much more reasonable range of expectations. b) Average
log reading times now span a more reasonable range of values. c) Differences in reading
times between object minus subject relatives; the values are now much more constrained
without many extreme values. d) Standard deviations of residual reading times; in contrast
to the diffuse priors, values are in a reasonable range. e) Maximal effect size (object - subject
relatives) across subjects; again, prior expectations are now much more reasonable compared
to the diffuse prior. f) Standard deviation of effect size (object - subject relatives) across
subjects; this no longer shows a dominance of extreme values. a)+c)-f) Values > 2000 or <
-2000 are plotted at 2000 or -2000 for visualization.
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Figure 10a shows that now the distribution over histograms of the data looks much
more reasonable, i.e., more like what we would expect for a histogram of observed data.
Very small values for reading times are now rare, and not heavily inflated any more.
Moreover, extremely large values for reading times larger than 2, 000 ms are rather unlikely.
We also take a look at the hypothetical average reading times (in log space; Fig. 10b),
and find that our expectations are now much more reasonable. We expect average reading
times of around log(6) = 403 ms. Most of the expected average reading times lie between
log(5) = 148 ms and log(7) = 1097 ms, and few extreme values beyond these numbers are
observed. The standard deviations of the residual reading times are also in a much more
reasonable range (see Fig. 10d), with only very few values larger than the extreme value of
2, 000 ms.
As a next step, we look at the expected effect size (OR minus SR) in the hypothetical
data (Fig. 10c). In this analysis, we again marginalize over the intercept, that is, we
consider all possible different values of the intercept in the computation. Extreme values of
larger or smaller than 2, 000 ms are now very rare, and most of the absolute values of
expected effect sizes are smaller than 200 ms. More specifically, we also check the maximal
effect size among all subjects (by computing the difference between mean reading times in
subject versus object relative sentences for each subject, and taking the maximal absolute
value; Fig. 10e). Most of the distribution centers below a value of 1000 ms, reflecting a
more plausible range of expected values. Likewise, the standard deviation of the
psycholinguistically interesting effect size across subjects now rarely takes values larger
than 500 ms (Fig. 10f), reflecting more modest assumptions than our first diffuse prior.
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Computational faithfulness
Next, we investigate the computational faithfulness of our computational methods for
estimating posterior model parameters for the current experimental design and priors. In
Stan and brm, lack of divergences and Rhats close to 1 indicate no problem for each
individual posterior fit (the recommended cut-off is 1.05).
Rhat, however, is known to be a limited measure of convergence as it fails to detect
some types of convergence problems (Vehtari, Gelman, Simpson, Carpenter, & Bürkner,
2019). Thus, even with a Rhat close to 1, one cannot be sure that the chains have
converged. One alternative method is to inspect the trace plots visually (see Fig. 12), and
to look for aspects of the samples that look like there could be problems with the sampling.
Problems can be visible as high correlations between parameters, that is, two traces moving
together over time. Alternatively, parameters may exhibit shifts over time, indicating their
estimate has not yet stabilized, parameter values may be higher or lower for one chain than
another, or parameters may not jump back and forth, but get stuck at certain values. All
of these indicate problems with convergence. Trace plots, however, are impractical for the
large models we want to build. Moreover, an improved version of Rhat is available together
with more advanced plotting facilities to detect convergence issues (Vehtari et al., 2019).
One difficulty with these kinds of criteria is that they generally cannot guarantee
convergence. They can indicate certain problems with convergence. If no issues are found,
however, this doesn’t guarantee that other problems might still be present.
By contrast, SBC provides a way to test whether the posterior is computed
accurately. It aggregates the results from many simulations together to see if the ensemble
shows any indication of inaccurate computation. To investigate accuracy of computations,
we use the simulated data drawn from the prior distributions and fit the statistical model
to this simulated data, estimating (approximate) posterior distributions. We use the
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function brm from the brms package for model fitting. Note that this process can take a
considerable amount of time and computational resources. On a single desktop machine
with reasonably complex data, this can take days or even weeks. Parallelizing model fits to
multiple cores on a computing cluster can help bring computing time down. If simulations
take too long, the researcher may consider using a smaller number of simulations. Talts et
al. (2018) suggest that any simulations are better than no simulations; thus, their
recommendation is to do as many simulations as possible with the resources available.
Because it is not practical to perform SBC for every single model and every single analysis,
an alternative path can be to investigate computational faithfulness (and model sensitivity)
once for a given research program, where many aspects of the experimental design, the
statistical model, and the priors may be repeated across analyses. For example, here we
perform the analysis for the Gibson & Wu (2013) design, and could also use these analyses
when analyzing a replication of their experiment. First, we estimate the model for all 1, 000
simulated data-sets (see Supplementary Code S8).
Next, we extract the number of divergent transitions of the HMC sampler to diagnose
potential problems in model fitting (see Supplementary Code S9).
We see that none of the models exhibited a difficulty with divergent samples.
Divergent transitions indicate problems in the model fitting, and should be diagnosed and
removed. In the present case, setting a control parameter known as “adapt_delta” to a
value higher than its default of 0.80 in brms removed the divergent transitions. Another
convergence diagnostic, Rˆ, is very close to 1 in all of the models (see Fig. 11), indicating no
problems in model convergence.
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Figure 11 . All values of rhat are close to 1, which indicates good model convergence for all
of the fitted models.
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Figure 12 . Density plots (left panels) and trace plots (right panels) for the intercept pa-
rameter (upper panels) and for the difference between subject and object relative sentences,
labeled b so (lower panels).
BAYESIAN WORKFLOW FOR COGNITIVE SCIENCE 52
The above steps provide an indication that the HMC chains may have converged to
the true posterior distribution and may have mixed well. This is visible in the right panels
of Figure 12. If the chains have converged and mixed well, then this plot looks like a "fat
hairy caterpillar".
Next, we perform simulation-based calibration (SBC) (Talts et al., 2018). This
method aims to determine whether estimated posterior model parameters follow the same
distribution as the prior model parameters used to generate the data. It does so by
comparing posterior estimates with the prior parameters used for simulating data. We
performed simulation-based calibration on the current data-set by computing, for each
simulated data-set, the rank of the prior parameter sample within the posterior samples.
More specifically, we compute the number of posterior samples that are larger than the
prior (simulating) parameter (i.e., larger than the sampled parameter value that was used
to simulate the data on which the model was fit). If the posterior distributions accurately
estimate the distribution of the parameter, then their distribution should be the same as
the distribution of the actual parameters used to generate the data, and the ranks should
be uniformly distributed.
Note that SBC presumes that posterior samples are independent and not correlated
(see Fig. 4). Our HMC samples, however, do exhibit autocorrelation. Autocorrelation is the
correlation of the samples with a delayed copy of itself, which can be computed for different
delays (Kmenta, 1971). Autocorrelation is visible in SBC histograms (see Fig. 4). To
remove the autocorrelation from the posterior samples, we thin our samples by taking only
every eighth sample (for a discussion of thinning in SBC see Talts et al., 2018). To test
how many samples should be removed, it’s possible to investigate the autocorrelation in the
samples (see Supplementary Code S10).
Importantly, note that thinning is usually not necessary nor advantageous when
evaluating the final model for the data. It can be shown that posterior inference is more
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precise when using un-thinned samples as compared to thinned samples (Link & Eaton,
2012), and thus thinning reduces the precision of the analysis.
Next, we plot a histogram of SBC ranks (compare Fig. 3; see Supplementary Code
S11).
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Figure 13 . Simulation-based calibration. Histogram of simulation-based ranks of true param-
eters used for simulating data (randomly drawn from the prior distributions) within posterior
samples fit to the simulated data. Shown for weakly informative priors. The results show
that the red bars are all contained within the grey horizontal bar in the background, indi-
cating the SBC ranks are uniformly distributed. This shows that the posterior recovers the
prior distribution well and that the posterior is thus estimated accurately.
In SBC, good recovery of the true simulating parameters in a posterior analysis is
evident when the SBC ranks are uniformly distributed. Figure 13 shows the histogram of
SBC ranks for the fixed effects parameter capturing the difference between subject and
object relative sentences ("so"). The grey bar in the background reflects the range of values
to be expected based on a uniform distribution (computed based on the quantile function
of a binomial distribution). The results do not show any evidence of divergence from the
BAYESIAN WORKFLOW FOR COGNITIVE SCIENCE 54
uniform distribution. This result suggests that we can trust the posterior estimates from
the brm function for the current experimental design, statistical model, and prior
distributions, that posterior samples do not exhibit bias, but instead that the samples from
the posterior follow the same distribution as the prior.
Note, however, that good recovery of model parameters is also possible when using
more diffuse priors. As discussed above, diffuse priors have been used by many previous
reading studies, choosing e.g., as the prior for the size of an experimental effect (here SR
versus OR) a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation one. Figure 14
shows that such diffuse priors support similarly accurate posterior computations.
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Figure 14 . Simulation-based calibration for diffuse priors (intercept: Normal(0,10); coef-
ficients: Normal(0,1)). This plot shows that, as for weakly informative priors, the SBC
samples are uniformly distributed. This demonstrates that the computational methods work
accurately also for the more diffuse priors. We saw above, however, that diffuse priors make
very implausible assumptions.
Note that here we only investigated the slope parameter that estimates the difference
in reading times between object relative and subject relative sentences (in log space). This
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is the parameter of theoretical interest to us. Similar analyses, however, are possible for all
other model parameters to investigate whether the given computational methods provide
accurate posterior estimates. Examples of other parameters of interest could be the
standard deviation of the experimental effect across subjects, or the correlations of the
effect with the intercept across subjects or items. If the researcher actually cares only
about one phenomenon, then the accuracy of that one effect is all one needs to check. That
is, as long as the model provides good faithfulness for the effect of interest, it does not
matter or hurt too much if other and irrelevant effects in the model are estimated more
poorly (Betancourt, 2018).
Last, computational faithfulness seems to be an issue in frequentist approaches to
standard linear mixed models (LMMs), where maximal LMMs frequently encounter
difficulties with model fitting. By contrast, the HMC methods implemented in Stan and
accessed using the brm function may be well able to cope with such models (even when
using rather vague priors), such that computational faithfulness may be less of an issue
with standard LMMs here. In brm the formulation of the likelihood is moreover highly
standardized, preventing errors in its formulation. Testing computational faithfulness,
moreover, will become very important when we define more customized models. The utility
to test computational faithfulness is exactly one of the advantages of this framework
(Nicenboim & Vasishth, 2018).
Model sensitivity
So far, we have identified appropriate priors using prior predictive checks, and have
validated posterior estimates using SBC. The next step is to investigate how sensitive
estimated posterior model parameters are to the true simulating parameters for the given
experimental design, statistical model, and set of prior parameters. We compute posterior
z-scores to assess deviation of estimated means from true means, and compute posterior
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contraction to investigate how much information is gained in the posterior relative to the
prior, that is, how much the uncertainty about a parameter of interest is reduced. We
study this for the theoretically important effect size of object versus subject relative
sentences (see Supplementary Code S12).
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Figure 15 . Analysis of model sensitivity. For each of N = 1,000 data-sets simulated from
the prior parameters and the model, plot the posterior z-score as a function of the posterior
contraction. The results show good posterior z-scores, as most of them are very close to
zero, indicating little overfitting to wrong values or prior/likelihood conflict. The results
for posterior contraction, however, are mixed. While some data-sets show very good (high)
contraction close to one, others have only weak contraction of about 0.5, reflecting the
relatively low number of participants and items in the experimental design.
Figure 15 shows posterior z-scores as a function of posterior contraction for all
simulated data-sets. The results show that posterior z-scores are overall relatively close to
zero, and mostly below absolute values of 2 (average: 0.82), reflecting good recovery of the
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ground truth. At the same time, posterior contraction ranges from only weak contraction
(i.e., less than 0.5), where not a lot of information is gained about the parameter in the
posterior relative to the prior, to very strong contraction (i.e., approaching 1), where
posterior uncertainty is much reduced. The average contraction is 0.69.
The sometimes low posterior contraction indicates a tendency that for some
simulated data-sets the slope parameter is not very well identified. This shortcoming may
reflect the relatively small number of observed data points in the present study, reflecting
insufficient resolution to detect an effect. Nevertheless, in some of the simulations model
sensitivity looks reasonable.
This observation shows that posterior behavior will vary with the observed data, and
that a model can be pathological for some data but not others. Since a priori we don’t
know what data we will ultimately observe, we want to check as many reasonable data-sets
as possible before running the study, which is conveniently done in the prior predictive
analyses.
How does model sensitivity look like in a situation with a higher resolution to detect
an effect? A replication study (Vasishth et al., 2013) is available for the present data-set by
Gibson & Wu (2013). Here, we combine the data from both studies to see how the
associated increase in statistical resolution affects model sensitivity. The results show that
posterior z-scores are relatively unchanged compared to the previous analysis, and mainly
are between absolute values of 2 (average: 0.83). For the posterior contraction, however,
the samples now cluster slightly more to the right of Figure 16a and b: mean contraction is
now 0.75 compared to the previous 0.69. This indicates somewhat stronger posterior
contraction as a result of the higher number of subjects. On average, the data thus now
provide more information on the parameter, and lead to a stronger reduction of uncertainty
about the parameter of interest. At the same time, however, the amount of contraction
strongly varies across different simulated data-sets. Even with the larger number of
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Figure 16 . Analysis of model sensitivity for more observations, achieved by pooling across
two data-sets. a) Results for pooled data-set (Exp 1: Gibson and Wu, 2012; Exp 2: Vasishth
et al., 2013). b) Results only for posterior contraction for Experiment 1 (Gibson and Wu,
2012) and for the pooled data-set (Exp. 1 + 2). a)+b) The results show that - as the data
now provides more information via the likelihood - this increased posterior contraction leads
to more concentrated and hence more informative posteriors. a) At the same time, posterior
z-scores are still rather close to zero, indicating good sensitivity.
subjects, contraction can be quite low (i.e., values around 0.5) for some simulated data-sets,
whereas it is high for others. This means that even with double the number of subjects, we
have no guarantee of getting informative results from our experiment.
Posterior predictive checks: Model adequacy
Having examined the prior predictive data in detail, we can now take the real,
observed data and perform posterior inference on it. We start by fitting a maximal brm
model to the observed data (see Supplementary Code S13).
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m_gw <- brm(rt ~ so + (1+so|subj) + (1+so|item), gw1,
family=lognormal(), prior=priors2, cores=4)
We check visually whether the chains seem to have converged and whether they mix
well (see Fig. 17).
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Figure 17 . Density plots (left panels) and trace plots (right panels) for the intercept pa-
rameter (upper panels) and for the difference between subject and object relative sentences,
labeled ’b so’ (lower panels).
Next, we look at the estimated parameter values for the fixed effects:
round(fixef(m_gw),3)
## Estimate Est.Error Q2.5 Q97.5
## Intercept 6.056 0.063 5.932 6.180
## so -0.028 0.023 -0.075 0.017
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Figure 18 shows the posterior distribution for the slope parameter, which estimates
the difference in reading times between object minus subject relative sentences (see
Supplementary Code S14).
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Figure 18 . Posterior distribution for the slope parameter, estimating the difference in reading
times between object relative minus subject relative sentences.
Figure 18 shows that the reading times in object relative sentences tends to be
slightly faster than in subject relative sentences (p(b<0) = 0.89); this is as predicted by
Gibson & Wu (2013). The 95% confidence intervals, however, overlap with zero; it is
difficult to rule out the possibility that there is effectively no difference in reading time
between the two conditions. Note that this analysis does not allow conclusions about
whether no difference in reading times between conditions exist, since we have not included
a model without any difference. We will do so below by using Bayes factor analyses.
To assess model adequacy, we perform posterior predictive checks. We simulate data
based on posterior samples of parameters. This then allows us to investigate the simulated
data by computing the summary statistics that we used in the prior predictive checks, and
by comparing model predictions with the observed data (see Supplementary Code S15).
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Figure 19 . Posterior predictive checks for weakly informative priors. Distributions are over
posterior predictive simulated data. a) Histograms of reading times. 10-90, 20-80, 30-70,
and 40-60 percent quantiles across histograms are shown as shaded areas; the median is
shown as a dotted line and the observed data as a solid line. For illustration, values > 2000
are plotted as 2000; modeling was done on the original data. b) Average reading times. c)
Differences in reading times between object minus subject relatives. d) Standard deviations
of residual reading times. e) Maximal effect size (object - subject relatives) across subjects.
f) Standard deviation of effect size (object - subject relatives) across subjects.
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These analyses show that the lognormal distribution (see Fig. 19a) provides an
approximation to the distribution of the data. Although the fit looks reasonable, however,
there is still systematic deviation from the data of the model’s predictions. This deviation
suggests that maybe a constant offset is needed in addition to the lognormal distribution.
This can be implemented in brm by replacing the family specification
family=lognormal() with the shifted version family=shifted_lognormal(), and would
motivate another round of model validation.
For the other summary statistics, we first look at the distribution of means. The
posterior predictive means capture the mean reading time in the observed data (indicated
by the vertical line in Fig. 19b) quite well. The same is true for the residual standard
deviation - the model captures the standard deviation of the data (Fig. 19d). Figure 19c
shows the effect size of object minus subject relative sentences predicted by model
(histogram) and observed in the data (vertical line). Again, posterior model predictions for
the effect are in line with the empirical data. The same is true for the biggest effect among
all subjects (Fig. 19e) and for the random effects standard deviation of the effect across
subjects (Fig. 19f).
We had mentioned above that some subjects were removed due to invalid data. Note
that in the frameworks of lme4 and brms these missing subjects cannot be modelled
without adding new functionality to these packages. This, however, is possible when using
Stan directly.
Bayes factor analysis
The posterior predictive checks suggest that the maximal model captures the
summary statistics of the data well, increasing our confidence that we can rely on the
model for interpreting the estimate for the effect size of object minus subject relatives
BAYESIAN WORKFLOW FOR COGNITIVE SCIENCE 63
(“so”). Simply testing the effect size, however, does not provide evidence on whether the
effect of relative clause type exists, i.e., whether it is different from zero. To answer this
question, we can compute Bayes factors, where we compare the maximal model to a
reduced model, where the fixed effect of the predictor “so” is missing (which essentially sets
its parameter to zero).
Bayes factors provide a way to quantify the evidence that some data provide in favor
of one model over another model. It evaluates the model and the prior by evaluating its
prior predictive accuracy. More specifically, the (marginal) likelihood of the observed data
given the model (including its priors) is computed for two models, and the ratio of
(marginal) likelihoods is the Bayes factor:
BF01 =
p(D | M0)
p(D | M1) =
∫
p(D | θ,M0)p(θ | M0)dθ∫
p(D | θ,M1)p(θ | M1)dθ (10)
For more detailed introductions to and treatments of Bayes factors, we refer to Ly,
Verhagen, & Wagenmakers (2016), Mulder & Wagenmakers (2016), Rouder, Haaf, &
Vandekerckhove (2018), and Schönbrodt & Wagenmakers (2018). Also see Gronau et al.
(2017) for a tutorial on Bridge sampling, which we use to compute Bayes factors.
A very important point here is that in the Bayes factor analysis, the more
informative priors that were derived from the prior predictive checks will be used. To
compute a Bayes factor in brm, a very large number of posterior samples are needed in
order to obtain stable Bayes factor values. The model is therefore re-fit twice with larger
number of samples (iter=10000), once with the fixed effect “so” included, and once
without the fixed effect for “so” (see Supplementary Code S16).
m_gw1 <- brm(rt ~ so + (1+so|subj) + (1+so|item), gw1,
family=lognormal(), prior=priors2, cores=4,
save_all_pars=TRUE, iter=10000, warmup=2000)
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m_gw0 <- brm(rt ~ 1 + (1+so|subj) + (1+so|item), gw1,
family=lognormal(), prior=priors2[-2,], cores=4,
save_all_pars=TRUE, iter=10000, warmup=2000)
BF_informative <- bayes_factor(m_gw1, m_gw0)
BF_informative
## Estimated Bayes factor in favor of bridge1 over bridge2: 0.65536
The results show a Bayes factor in favor of the model H1 of approximately 0.65,
which translates into a Bayes factor in favor of H0 of 1.5. This indicates that there is slight
support for the null model over the maximal model, but that the data do not allow us to
prefer any of the two models over the other. Thus, it is not clear from this data-set
whether there is a difference in reading times between Chinese subject and object relative
clauses. By contrast, the published study (Gibson & Wu, 2013) reported a significant effect
of subject versus object relative clauses (based on a repeated measures ANOVA) and
concluded that the effect was present.
The choice of informative priors is crucial for a valid analysis of Bayes factors (Ly et
al., 2016; Mulder & Wagenmakers, 2016; Rouder et al., 2018; Schönbrodt & Wagenmakers,
2018). If the prior assumes that extremely large values for the “so” effect are possible, then
the Bayes factor assesses whether there is evidence for such extremely large effect sizes. Of
course, this is very unlikely to be the case empirically. By contrast, when using weakly
informative priors (e.g., those informed by the prior predictive checks outlined above), then
the prior assumes small to medium effect sizes for the “so” effect, and the Bayes factor
accordingly tests whether there is evidence for such small or medium effect sizes.
Indeed, when we re-compute the Bayes factor between the maximal model and the
reduced model, but using the vague or diffuse priors discussed above, the Bayes factor (in
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support of H1) is strongly reduced:
## Estimated Bayes factor in favor of bridge1 over bridge2: 0.03981
We now have strong support for the null model. The meaning of the Bayes factor is
determined by the order in which the models are entered into the calculation. A Bayes
factor of roughly2 0.04 indicates that the first of the two models, here the null model,
receives more evidence from the data than the second model, here the maximal model.
Now, there is suddenly strong evidence for the null hypothesis! Note that the only thing
that was changed was the prior. With the diffuse/vague priors employed in the second
Bayes factor analysis, there is clear evidence that extremely large differences between
subject and object relatives are not supported by the data.
These results on how Bayes factors are highly sensitive to the prior highlight the
importance of using reasonable priors when comparing Bayesian models. Simply using
diffuse/vague priors can strongly bias Bayes factors towards the reduced model. It is
therefore crucial to use domain knowledge to encode reasonable expectations about the size
of the expected effect(s) of interest into (weakly) informative priors. A good strategy is to
display a range of Bayes factors using increasingly informative priors. For an example, see
Nicenboim, Vasishth, & Rösler (2019).
In this context, we note that it is possible to define critical parameters that are
added, constrained, or removed in model expansion/deflation, and nuisance parameters
that are needed in all models. Examples of nuisance parameters are a grand mean intercept
parameter and a residual variance parameter. These parameters do not define the
differences among models between the initial model and the aspirational model. Thus,
2The bayes_factor() command should be run several times to make sure that the number is stable
with respect to the randomness inherent to bridge sampling estimators. We are currently writing a paper
discussing the instability of Bayes factor computations using Bridge sampling.
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uninformative priors may be adequate for nuisance parameters when computing Bayes
factors. Importantly, however, nuisance parameters can still have a strong influence on
model comparisons using Bayes factor. For example, in linear models a strong prior on
measurement variability (i.e., the residual variance) allows weaker data to differentiate
better between models and drastically affects the Bayes factor. Moreover, in a log-normal
distribution as assumed in our example analysis, the prior on the intercept parameter also
has an influence on what we expect for the effect size. Therefore, the nuisance grand mean
intercept is not completely independent of the critical effect size effect. We therefore (and
for reasons of sampling speed, see below) recommend using reasonably constrained priors
even on nuisance parameters.
One of the biggest motivations of a principled workflow is to consider a model in its
entirety so that we don’t have to worry about what terms cancel or how influences
factorize. We just analyze the entire model and all of its joint consequences.
An important open question we do not discuss in the present paper is that the Bayes
factor itself will be quite variable under repeated sampling; the stability of the Bayes factor
will be discussed in a future paper.
An additional benefit of incorporating more domain knowledge into the prior is that
this speeds up posterior sampling. For example, consider the maximal model for the “so”
effect: for this, we recorded the time it took (in seconds) to fit one model and to perform
the Bayes factor analysis (using the command proc.time()), and we did so for the diffuse
priors and for the weakly informative priors (see Supplementary Code S17).
Incorporating domain knowledge into the priors lead to a speed-up in fitting the brm
model and running the Bayes factor analysis from 152 seconds for the diffuse/vague priors
to 102 seconds for the weakly informative priors. With more complex models, larger data
sets, or when investigating computational faithfulness or model sensitivity, these time
BAYESIAN WORKFLOW FOR COGNITIVE SCIENCE 67
differences can become substantial.
Note that we here present one possible perspective on treating priors in Bayesian
modeling. In this exposition, the prior does not carry strong theoretical weight. We aim for
inference on model parameters. In Bayesian data analysis, the priors are necessary even
though we may not have very strong theoretical a priori constraints for the model
parameters. In the principled Bayesian workflow, the goal therefore is to understand the
role of the prior for the parameters, and to and to ensure that the influence of the priors is
consistent with ones principled domain expertise.
For completeness, note that a different perspective on the role of priors in Bayesian
analyses is also possible. In this alternative perspective or approach, the prior defines
theoretically useful properties, and it is chosen not based on substantive ranges but on
theoretical constraints (Vandekerckhove et al., 2018). In this case, because the prior is part
of the model, methods for expanding or reducing the models should be sensitive to the
model. Importantly, this includes being sensitive to the prior. Therefore, the sensitivity of
the Bayes factor to the prior provides a very useful aspect of Bayesian modeling that allows
the researcher to test substantive cognitive questions by constraining prior assumptions
about the parameters to compare different models. An aspect of this can be implemented
in sensitivity analyses, where different assumptions about the priors are entertained, and
Bayes factors are used to compare models which differ only in their priors, in order to learn
about which priors are best supported by the data.
Summary
We have introduced key questions to ask about a model and the inference process as
discussed by Betancourt (2018), and have applied this to a data-set from an experiment
involving a typical repeated measures experimental design used in cognitive psychology and
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psycholinguistics. Prior predictive checks using analyses of simulated prior data suggest
that, compared to previous applications in reading experiments (e.g., Nicenboim &
Vasishth, 2018), far more informative priors can and should be used. We showed that
including such additional domain knowledge into the priors leads to more plausible
expected data. Moreover, incorporating more informative priors (if they change the
posterior) can also speed up the HMC sampling process. These more informative priors,
however, may not alter posterior inferences much for the present design. We also
investigated computational faithfulness using simulation-based calibration (SBC) and
showed that prior model parameters were well recovered using posterior estimation,
supporting the used estimation procedure (brm() function as a wrapper to Stan) for the
current setup. Analysis of model sensitivity showed that the critical theoretical effect of a
psycholinguistic manipulation was estimated without bias as posterior z-scores were
centered around zero. Posterior contraction varied between medium and strong contraction,
indicating somewhat weak statistical sensitivity in a rather small sample size. In line with
this limited model sensitivity, posterior inference on the experimental effect based on the
observed data did not provide strong evidence for the experimental effect of interest,
leaving uncertain whether it differs from zero. Posterior predictive checks showed strong
support for our statistical model, as the model successfully recovered most of the tested
summary statistics. The Bayes factor analysis showed some weak evidence for no effect
(with diffuse priors) and an inconclusive result (with informative priors). Our overall
conclusion would be that we did not learn much from the experiment. As an aside, note
that the published result in Gibson & Wu (2013) showed a statistically significant effect
(using repeated measures ANOVA) and concluded that the effect was present. Although
this significant effect was due to model misspecification (Vasishth et al., 2013), in general it
can happen that the results of a frequentist and Bayesian analysis do not yield the same
conclusion. This is an instance of what is sometimes termed "Lindley’s paradox" (Lindley,
1957), which describes situations where the results from Bayesian and frequentist
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hypothesis tests differ from each other. Importantly, however, frequentist null hypothesis
significance testing and a Bayesian decision making process are different things, and a
certain calibration of one does not imply the same calibration of the other. Therefore, the
differences that we see between them are expected, and not really a paradox.
In summary, this analysis provides a fully worked example and tutorial for using the
principled Bayesian workflow (Betancourt, 2018) in cognitive science experiments. The
workflow reveals useful information about which (weakly informative) priors to use, and
performs checks of the used inference procedures and the statistical model. The workflow
provides a robust foundation for using a statistical model to answer scientific questions, and
will be useful for researchers developing analysis plans as part of preregistrations, registered
reports, or simply as preparatory design analyses prior to conducting an experiment.
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